THE LANDING OF THE DUTCH FLEET IN TORBAY 1688

[aukepalmhof]

In 1988 the Netherlands issued a stamp which remembers the landing of the Dutch troops in the Torbay for the invasion of England in 1688, on the right of the stamp a small drawing most probably of a Dutch warship is shown, Prince Willem of the Netherlands with his wife Mary are also depict on the left of the stamp.
Prince Willem used as his flagship for the passage the Dutch warship BRIELLE, if she is depict??
The chief reasons for the United Provinces to invade England were James II's policy against Protestantism and the fear he might ally himself with France in the next war. In the long run it was in the Dutch interest to have a Protestant England. The birth of a crown prince to King James II on 10 June 1688 was therefore a trigger to invade. Even before that William had played with the idea of an invasion, for in late April he had indicated to Admiral Russel that if important Englishmen formally invited him he could come over by late September. This formal invitation came about by the letter from the Immortal Seven on 18/28 June. After the birth of the crown-prince William had sent Zuylestein to congratulate. He also investigated the sentiments in England, and on his return he gave a very positive advice for the invasion.
Preparations
The invasion of England required a mobilization of the Dutch fleet and the army, hiring a very expensive transport fleet and hiring even more troops to stand-in for those moving to England. The first requirement to do all this was to have a lot of money. This was found by the States taking a loan of 4,000,000 guilders in order to repair the fortresses in the east. At the end of September it became clear that Prussia would march into the territory of Cologne, and then it was proposed to re-loan this money to William III for his invasion plans.
The Dutch fleet was secretly mobilized, but a part was displayed when 24 ships set sail on pretense of protecting the merchant fleet. The States also made a fund to pay 9,000 sailors. All this prompted James II to equip a fleet of about 15 ships under Roger Strickland, a Catholic.
A transport fleet of about 500 vessels was hired in divers Dutch ports. These had to carry the army with 11,000 horses, a supply train and 20,000 arms.
The national army was brought to strength by adding 10,000 troops.
On the death of the Elector of Brandenburg on 29 April 1688, Bentinck was sent to compliment the new elector. Bentinck negotiated with him; the Landgrave of Hessen and the Duke of Celle. The Duke of Hannover was ultimately swayed because his wife was in the line of succession to the English throne. All in all this brought 13,000 troops at the Dutch disposal. Here the crisis over the succession to the bishoprics of Cologne; Münster; Hildesheim and Liège was sufficient cover to mobilize troops.
The army destined for the invasion was then ordered to a two-month camp near Nijmegen. This forced the officers and men to bring their equipment to the field. In the beginning of October these troops were then marched to the Zuiderzee, where they embarked for Texel and then continued to Hellevoetsluis.
The First Invasion attempt
On 16/26 October the wind that had been west for so long turned east. That same day William took his leave of the States General. In the evening of the 19/29 October the fleet set sail for the first time. The next day the wind turned north and then north west. At night it turned into a storm. After a long struggle the order to return to Hellevoetsluis was given on the 21/31. On the 22/1 November the majority of the transport fleet was back in port. All other transport ships came in later. 500 horses had died, but were soon replaced. All men of war continued at sea, where they weathered a severe storm for six hours on the 27th/6th. The battle fleet then came in on the 28th/7th.
The English measures
On 1/11 October Lord Dartmouth had taken command of the fleet that had been under Strickland's orders. As stated above it was still equipping. On 8/18 October King James told Dartmouth that though not all ships were ready, he could soon sail and should profit from the westerly wind in order to get free of the sands7. On 12/22 October Dartmouth communicated to James from a position near the Buoy of the Nore that he was just as eager to sail. He did however think it unwise to sail out in parcels and to get separated8. In other words his fleet was not complete. As particular Dartmouth mentions that except for the Advice, none of the Portsmouth ships had yet arrived. From the OOB above we can assume that these were the ships marked as at Portsmouth or Spithead (near Portsmouth). These would amount to 3 3rd-rates; 1 4th-rates and 4 burners, 4 other 4th-rates were also still missing.
On 17/27 October Dartmouth at Oaz Edge communicated that weather permitted the fleet would go to the Gunfleet9. On 19/29 October Dartmouth was still at Oaze edge. He communicated to Pepys that the wind was easterly, and again that he intended to go to Gunfleet10. On 24/3 November the fleet sailed at 08:00AM and at noon it anchored at the buoy of Gunfleet. The fleet stayed at Gunfleet a while and was said to count 32 fighting ships and 13 burners on 29/8 November. Yet, the OOB has 33 3&4 rates and 2 6th rates for this date. The difference can be explained by that on the 28/7 November Dartmouth had sent out the BONAVENTURE SWALLOW and FORESIGHT to reconnoiter.
On 30/9 November Dartmouth reported the wind had been blowing between north and N.N.E. most of the night, and that he unmoored at 04:00 AM. Since then he sailed with Ebb and the wind S.S.E., and hoped to clear the Galloper. That same day the fleet anchored at 06:00 PM, 'The Naze bearing W. and Balzy church N.W.', the wind due east. The place of anchorage was put more precise by Collins as: 'between Sledway and the Longsand Head, the Naze bearing West and the church of Bawdsey (N.E. of Felixstowe) N.W. half N.' He also pointed out that the KATHERINE Yacht was sent east; the KITCHEN Yacht south and the SAUDADOS north.
The English fleet then most probably did not move at all from 31/10 till 3/13 November and did not get to The Galloper due to adverse winds, see Collins' remark below about weathering the sands. The end-result of all these preparations and maneuvers was that the fleet was not in a good position to intercept the Dutch. The cause why it did not sail earlier to achieve this position was its weakness. It was too small and its ships were not sea worthy enough for the season. Dartmouth probably knew both. The poor quality of the ships would be proven in the few weeks after the landing.
The Successful Crossing
Departure and entry into the Channel
On the evening tide of 1/11 November the invasion fleet sailed a second time. The wind blew strongly from the east. Up till noon of the 2/12th the fleet tried to steer north, but when that proved impossible it steered west.
On the English side 3 ships were still in the river. Of those the WOOLWICH and NEWCASTLE were ready, but now held up by adverse winds. The SAINT ALBANS was not. The PORTLAND was ordered to be fit forth and the PHOENIX was believed to be ordered shortly.
On 3/13 November the Dutch fleet entered the English Channel. Before dusk it saw the Isle of Whight.
The English fleet under Dartmouth sighted some 6 Dutch ships, but was kept locked up at Gunfleet by the adverse wind and tide. In Dartmouth's account: 'Just at the break of dawn on Saturday morning (3/13 Nov), we saw 13 sail about three leagues to windward of us; etc', 'I got all ready to sail with the fleet on Saturday, but the sea came in so heavy, and the tide fell so cross, that we could not till yesterday (4/14 November) morning. Collins stated that the fleet had lifted their anchors, but the ebb being almost spent, it did not succeed in weathering the Longsand Head and the Kentish Knock.
At noon on the 4/14 Russel came on board William's ship with pilots that had to steer to a position before Dartmouth (a place just south of Torbay), on the next morning.
On the English side the fleet sailed at 08:00AM on 4/14 November with a E.S.E. wind to the north. At 20:00PM the fleet rounded Southsands Head. At midnight it was near Dungeness.
Landing at Torbay and Failure of the English interception
On morning of the 5/15 the Dutch fleet discovered it had sailed past Torbay. It thought it might have to settle for a landing near fortified Plymouth, because the wind was still blowing from the east, though somewhat calmer. All of sudden the wind then got calmer and turned south. On this spell of luck the fleet then sailed to Torbay in 4 hours time. Torbay is a natural harbor, and soon lots of officers and soldiers were on shore.
On the same 5/15th at 0:00AM the wind fell silent for the English fleet, and it could hardly keep up against the flood. At 9:00AM it was no further than Beachy Head. On 5/15 November Dartmouth sent a letter to King James II which nicely confirms which capital ships were in his fleet. He reports that Strickland, Berry and Davis entreated him not to engage the Dutch because the fleet was too weak. Dartmouth explains this by mentioning which ships were missing. For him missing meant originally assigned to him and now not with him. He mentions 2 fireships, 6 men of war that had sailed with him, and 4 that James II knew very well not to have sailed with him.
On the 6th the invasion force was shown a place where it could conveniently land horses. At the place the horses only had to swim for 20 yards. In a dead calm sea all horses were landed in 3 hours. At noon on the 7/17 the army was marching and covered 4 miles towards Exeter. A great storm rose from the west on 7/17, but did little damage to the Dutch fleet anchored at Torbay. The English fleet was still in pursuit and had reached the height of Whight or Portland when it met the storm. It could not resist it, was blown back to Beachy Head and finally anchored in The Downs. With this the attempt to intercept the Dutch fleet or disturb its landing had failed. The further adventures of the English fleet are described above.

Netherlands 1988 75c sg1535, scott?
Source: http://www.spanishsuccession.nl/battle_ ... gland.html